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ABSTRACT
Why do individuals engage in or support acts of contentious politics? Building from
previous work, this article uses a 2 (high/low grievance) × 2 (high/low risk) × 2 (high/low
opportunity) online experimental design to examine the impact of these factors on
political action with participants from Egypt (n = 517) and Morocco (n = 462).
Participants assumed a first-person perspective as a member of a fictional oppressed
ethnic minority group in one of eight vignettes. Participants then indicated the extent to
which they would engage in various forms of protest and violence, and how justified
such actions were. Participants answered several social-personality measures: Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Activism and
Radicalism Intentions Scale (AIS and RIS). Analyses show that higher SDO and RIS
scores largely drive violent engagement and justification for these actions. Higher AIS
scores predicted protest engagement and justification, while SDO negatively influenced
non-violence. RWA scores decreased engagement in and support for any form of
political action. In contrast with previous experimental findings, grievance did not impact
decisions about political mobilization.
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Introduction
The current research focuses on the question of why people mobilize, a phenomenon
long explained by repression and grievance (e.g., Bloom, 2005; Crenshaw, 1983;
Pinard, 2011; Ross, 1993). However, many people regularly face political repression
and express grievances, yet comparatively few actually take action (Collier & Hoeffler,

2001, p. 2). Repression and grievance alone prove insufficient to explain galvanization
to protest and violence. Marx himself argued that, given oppression’s constant presence
in cross-demographic daily life, identification of other factors remains necessary (Marx &
Engels, 1848). Why then do some people who experience grievance mobilize for
political action while others do not? In addition to contextual factors like grievance, risk,
and opportunity, how do individual-level factors influence mobilization?
The majority of scholarly interest on mobilization has focused on the state level
(e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 1970; McAdam, Tarrow, &
Tilly, 2001; Skocpol, 1979; Tarrow, 1998). Considerably fewer studies investigate
individual-level factors that lead to mobilization (for an important exception see
Weinstein, 2007). Further, scholars rarely use experimental methods to understand
mobilization. This constitutes an opportunity to shed new light on questions of
galvanization to political action. With the ability to ensure control over treatments,
researchers can tackle issues that are difficult to measure or control for – even crudely
– with exclusively observational data.
This study adds three components to our previous experimental work on
mobilization. First, our original work focused on the United States where people have
less experience with discrimination, mass protest, and violence over the past few
decades. Thus, our vignettes may have had limited salience. The present study aims –
in part – to rectify this limitation with online general population samples from two
countries that have recently experienced large-scale mobilization for social and political
change: Egypt and Morocco. Second, we add a new variable for experimental
manipulation: the opportunity to engage in action. In this project, we manipulate three
contextual factors (grievance, risk, and opportunity) and examine how each impacts on
mobilization. Third, we include new social-personality measures that are theoretically
linked to mobilization: Activism and Radicalism Intention (ARIS). We measure four
social-personality factors in this study and examine their impact on mobilization: Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), RightWing
Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988), and Activism and Radicalism Intention
(Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Combining contextual variables and individual factors
can provide insight to address the puzzle of why some people decide to engage in
political action while others do not.
We first discuss how grievances, risk, and opportunity may influence support for
various forms of mobilization. As the present paper shares similar background and
context with our previous work, we provide an abbreviated review of the literature on
grievance and risk here (see Lemieux & Asal, 2010 for a full discussion). We then
explore the potential impact exerted by individual-level factors on the actions people will
justify and undertake in the context of intergroup relations. We next describe our
experimental design, country selection and background details, data collection process,
and analysis. We conclude with a review of our findings, their limitations, and points of
consideration for future research.

Grievances and mobilization
Dating back at least to Machiavelli (1532), political action has been explained by
grievances based upon fundamental rights violations. More recently, Gurr (1970)
argued that relative deprivation creates a sense of grievance that drives mobilization.
Here relative deprivation is defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value
expectations and their value capabilities” (p. 13). Yet it is difficult to measure relative
deprivation (Aya, 1990), so discrimination is often used as a proxy for grievance (e.g.,
Gurr, 1993; Gurr & Moore, 1997). Studies using multiple data sources find that ethnic
minorities subject to discrimination are more likely to mobilize politically and to engage
in violence (e.g., Goodwin, 2001; Hibbs, 1973).
While the general focus on grievances and mobilization has been at the macrolevel, early evidence suggests that this link exists at the individual level as well.
Qualitative research, largely from psychology, links grievances and violence, especially
in the context of terrorism (Horgan, 2005; Victoroff, 2005). Some quantitative research
similarly finds that grievance influences mobilization (Ennis & Schreuer, 1987; Irons,
1998), while other work argues that the connection is weak (Humphreys & Weinstein,
2006). In the present study, salient points across multiple categories of grievance were
woven into a single cohesive narrative to create the experimental conditions of high and
low grievance. Overall, we expect that there may be some differences between
countries, but that the general responses here will be consistent with results from our
previous work. We anticipate that the effect of grievance should remain relatively
consistent as an underlying influence on mobilization, specifically:
(1) High grievance will:
(a) increase the likelihood of any form of political participation in general;
(b) increase participation in protests;
(c) increase participation in attacks;
(d) increase justification for protests;
(e) increase justification for attacks.
Risk, opportunity, and mobilization
Research on how opportunity structures influence political mobilization finds that
risks or opportunities presented by the political environment move individuals or groups
away from or towards mobilization (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978). When people perceive
the capacity and capability for success, it plausibly influences the type of actions they
choose to take, or the level of support that they lend. When there is a safe way to
engage in politics, more people will mobilize (Tilly, 1978). Since most research on how
costs and benefits impact mobilization operates from a perspective of game theory
(Lichbach, 1998), there is less empirical research on this topic (Almanzar & Herring,
2004). At the individual level, risk of punishment has been shown to impact people’s

decision to mobilize (Ennis & Schreuer, 1987). Many studies, however, operationalize
risk as a cost to be paid rather than the likelihood that a potential cost would be
imposed on the individual (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). This is problematic, as the potential
risks faced by those who mobilize in the real world are not guaranteed and can differ
across individuals, as Lichbach (1995) discusses. From this discussion, we expect that:
(2) High risk will:
a) reduce the likelihood of any form of political participation in general;
b) reduce participation in protests;
c) reduce participation in attacks;
d) not impact justification for protests;
e) not impact justification for attacks.
(3) High opportunity will:
(a) increase the likelihood of any form of political participation in general;
(b) increase participation in protests;
(c) increase participation in attacks;
(d) increase justification for protests;
(e) increase justification for attacks.
Social-personality factors and mobilization
Most theoretical discussion of mobilization focuses on contextual factors in
society. Yet individual-level research provides the ability to explore how personality
factors can explain why some people mobilize while others do not, particularly when the
contextual factors remain similar. Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing
Authoritarianism, Activism Intention, and Radicalism Intention constitute a few such
social-personality factors.
Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) argues how and why some
people are inclined to maintain a hierarchically organized society. The more someone is
invested in maintaining group-based dominance in society, the higher they will score on
SDO. RWA is associated with concerns about maintaining the status quo in society.
Higher RWA scores should be associated with less inclination to take action of any sort.
Our previous work finds that SDO and RWA play consistent roles in the likelihood to
mobilize, type of action preferred, and justification for political action regardless of
grievance and risk conditions (see Lemieux & Asal, 2010). We find that people with
higher SDO scores were more likely to both engage in and justify violence, but less
likely to do either for non-violent action. People with higher RWA scores, however, were

less likely to engage in or justify any action at all. We expect these factors to have the
same impact in the present study.
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) created the Activism and Radicalism Intention
Scales to measure propensity to engage in both legal, non-violent political action (AIS)
and illegal, violent political action (RIS). Rather than activism functioning as a precursor
to radicalization, they clearly distinguish between these two dimensions of political
action using samples from the United States and Ukraine. We expect that people with
higher RIS scores will behave similarly to those with higher SDO scores. Stated
differently, participants with higher RIS scores prove more likely to both engage in and
justify violence, but less likely to do either in the case of non-violent action. Conversely,
we expect that higher AIS scores will increase support for protest only, but not violence.
Given that ARIS measures have been validated in samples from different countries, we
expect the same clear patterns to emerge across cultural contexts in the present study.
(4) Higher SDO will increase participation in and justification for attacks only.
(5) Higher RIS will increase participation in and justification for attacks only.
(6) Higher AIS will increase participation in and justification for protest only.
(7) Higher RWA will decrease participation in and justification for both attacks
and protest.
Research design, sample, country background, and methodology
We aim to explain individuals’ willingness to mobilize or justify violent or nonviolent action on the basis of both manipulated factors (grievance, risk, and opportunity)
and measured factors (SDO, RWA, AIS, and RIS). The experimental method’s strength
lies in its capacity to control the treatment that each participant receives, and thus
ensure our data includes sufficient and representative variation along multiple
dimensions of interest. Studies that rely on observational data may lack such variation,
cannot disentangle the impact of factors that tend to co-vary, and often select
participants on dependent variables (i.e., interviewing people who have engaged in
terrorism; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003).
Sample
A potential limitation of our previous work in the United States is that the
vignettes describe scenarios that may not have direct salience with much of the
population. In the present study, we examine the extent to which our previous findings
are applicable across cultural and political contexts. To do so, we chose two samples:
one from Egypt and one from Morocco. These samples allow us to test our argument
with populations that have country-level experience with grievances, protests, and
violence. As briefly discussed below, there are differences in the political and social
contexts across the two countries. These differences may shape how participants

respond to our experimental manipulations and survey questions. To account for this
possibility, we analysed results for the two countries separately.1
Zogby Analytics, an international polling firm, administered the study. The sample
drew from online panels representative of each country’s adult population in Egypt (n =
517) and Morocco (n = 462). Thousands of adults in each country were invited to
participate in this study. Using census data, voter files, and other resources, Zogby
used weighting techniques to approximate the demographics of each population for the
samples. Data for the Egyptian sample were collected on 3–7 October 2013. Data for
the Moroccan sample were collected between 3 October and 4 November 2013. See
Table 1 for a detailed demographic breakdown.
Egypt
Since the revolution of 1952 and the start of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule, the
military has been the dominant force in Egyptian politics and its economy. However,
Egypt’s military dictatorship, its emphasis on Arab nationalism as a guiding philosophy,
and its close relations with the US and Israel have inflamed many on both the left and
the right in society. There were three cycles of protest in the decade prior to the 2011
uprising against the war in Iraq, in favour of democracy, and inspired by labour and
employment concerns (El-Mahdi, 2014).
First, Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel was a source of deep resentment. The
1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel never had the support of the Egyptian
people (The Guardian, 2011). Under Mubarak, many Egyptians thought their regime
supported Israel’s security and facilitated its power, and became Israel’s primary
provider of energy. After Mubarak was overthrown, protestors destroyed the Israeli
embassy in Cairo – a manifestation of the resentment – while Egyptian security forces
looked on.
Second, the country suffered from high unemployment, with a record 13.2% in
2010 (Fam & Shahine, 2013). Eight out of every ten unemployed were under 30 – and
more than a quarter held university degrees. High unemployment and the lack of
representation in government were prime catalysts for the Arab Spring in Egypt.

Third, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had decades of conflict with the military
regime. After the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954,
thousands of its members were imprisoned and the government banned it from political
participation. Still, the group provided social welfare goods where the state was unable
or unwilling to do so, and thus became influential. After Arab Spring protests helped to
successfully depose Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party came to power – at least in part – because of its strong organization and
connection with society, built over decades, in comparison with the fervent but
unseasoned contenders. Mass protests against Muslim Brotherhood rule called for a
new election, early elections, and Mohamed Morsi’s impeachment.
Morocco
There are significant points of contention in Morocco. First, the Moroccan
government has a large Salafi Jihadist movement within its borders – one that has
perpetrated major terrorist attacks on home soil. Second, many Moroccans consider the
quality of their government as very low and see corruption as a significant problem.
Third, there is a longstanding conflict over the Western Sahara between Morocco and
the Polisario Front, with occasional involvement from Algeria and France. Views on this
issue tend to run parallel to other grievances against the government (CIA, 2016). Yet
many are hesitant to rebel given the recent history of incarcerating political dissidents.
Transparency International’s National Integrity System Assessments (2010)
found that nepotism in Morocco is considered “a fact of life”. Morocco attempted to
address this problem through ratifying the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, the most comprehensive international convention targeting corruption
(Transparency International’s National Integrity System Assessments, 2011). The state
also tried to address grievances brought to its attention during the Arab Spring through
significant institutional reforms. In a 2011 referendum, the vast majority of Moroccans
(98.49%) voted for reforms that shifted considerable power from the king to the prime
minister and parliament (CNN, 2011). For instance, voters now elect a prime minister
where in the past the king appointed him. Further, the prime minister can now dissolve
the parliament, and must be consulted if the king wishes to do the same. Yet one of the
remaining grievances aired often on the ground is the overwhelming control by the
monarchy over the Moroccan economy, and the fact that political reforms cannot
remove entrenched nepotism at the heart of the economic sector.
Design
The online experiments were conducted using a 2 (high/low grievance) by 2
(high/low risk) by 2 (high/low opportunity) experimental design that created eight
conditions. Each participant was randomly assigned to read one vignette that reflected
the relevant combination of factors. These vignettes asked the participant to imagine
that they lived in a hypothetical country, which allows for control over the information
received by participants and increased internal validity (McDermott, 2002). Participants

were then asked to indicate the likelihood that they would take any action (a general
propensity to mobilize), which action(s) they would take, and the extent to which each
form of action was justified. We also measured a series of social-personality factors2 :
SDO (9-item scale, α = 0.74), RWA (10-item scale, α = 0.68), AIS (4-item scale, α =
0.93), and RIS (4-item scale, α = 0.90).3 All experimental materials and protocols were
approved by the Institutional Review Board, and all materials were translated by
certified professionals for online administration and were assessed for accuracy.

Results and discussion
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the key variables by country. While about
half of the participants in each country state that they would engage in protest, far fewer
indicate that they would participate in or justify violence in any form. Normatively, this is
a positive thing. Though the small number of participants who indicate that they would
engage in violence limits our ability to make statistical inferences about factors that
contribute to these decisions.
For this study, there are 13 outcome variables. First, we are interested in
participants’ likelihood to engage in any form of action. Next, we are interested in
whether or not participants are willing to take seven different actions in support of the
cause: protest locally, protest against US embassy, student union bombing, police
station bombing, train station bombing, US embassy bombing, and US homeland
bombing. The targets of violence range from symbolic to state agents to civilian: student
union bombing (no casualties), police station bombing (state-linked casualties), and
train station bombing (civilian casualties). Third, we are interested in how justified
participants think these seven possible actions are. We estimated separate regression
models for each country and dependent variable. Recall that participants were randomly
assigned to read one vignette that manipulated three elements: the level of grievanceprovoking behaviours their group faces at the hands of the majority group, the extent to
which those who take action are likely to be punished, and the opportunity to
successfully engage in actions. All models are reported with dummy variables for high
levels of each treatment (grievance, risk, opportunity) and with scores for each of the
social-personality factors (SDO, RWA, AIS, and RIS). While demographics like gender
and age could reasonably be expected to affect results, we did not find that either had a
systematic impact on outcomes in a similarly designed study with a different population.
We estimated models to include age and race, but again neither substantively altered
the findings so we do not report those models. We also estimated models with only
treatment dummies, with only each condition, and with each condition plus the socialpersonality factors. These modelling decisions did not substantively alter the findings
across outcome and thus are not reported. All tables present odds ratios for each
independent variable; ratios greater than one indicate a positive relationship between
the independent and dependent variables whereas ratios less than one indicate a
negative relationship. For simplicity’s sake across models, we do not report constants
and all standard errors are presented in parentheses after the odds ratios.

First, we examine actions that participants are willing to take. In Table 3, we
examine participants’ likelihood to take any action. Participants were asked “How likely
is it that you will engage in any form of political action?” on a seven-point scale, so we
estimated these models with ordered logistic regression.4
We expected that the treatments would impact on a person’s likelihood to
engage in political action,5 yet the results do not support this. In Egypt, there are no
effects. In Morocco, risk decreases the likelihood of taking any action. Freedom of
speech in Morocco has several clear red lines that absolutely affect what people see as
action, and what people consider as risk, which may explain the findings in this context.
When we turn to individual-level factors, clearer patterns emerge. As expected, higher
AIS scores are positively associated with political engagement in both samples. While
higher SDO, RWA, and RIS were each associated with lower likelihood of action, results
varied between the samples. These findings demonstrate that individual-level factors
can help explain political action, but suggest that cultural factors may affect their
importance.
In Table 4, we examine participants’ decision to engage in protest and various
forms of violence.6 The text of these questions is found in the table. The dependent
variables are each a binary choice so we estimated these models with logistic
regression.

Again, we expected that the treatments would affect engagement in various
forms of political action, but the results largely do not support this. While grievances are
linked to political action in our previous experimental work, grievance only increases
engagement in the train station bombing with the Moroccan sample. Risk does not
impact on action, though this is largely in line with previous findings. This suggests that
risk is not a particularly deterrent factor. As expected, opportunity increased
engagement in protests, though only in the Moroccan sample. During the Arab Spring,
people were more willing to come out in the open, when the monarchy was willing to
allow a “steam valve” for dissent without the normal consequences. For example,
people were allowed to take photos in parliament during a six-month period, which was
unprecedented. On throne day in July 2011, this was shut down abruptly, and
repression was reinstated as the norm. Protestors gauged risk based, in part, on the
ability of the international media to cover the events, and came out – or did not –
accordingly. Contrary to expectations, opportunity decreased engagement in violence
for Moroccans. In Egypt, the treatment conditions have no effect.

When we turn to individual-level factors, clearer patterns begin to emerge. As
expected, higher RWA scores consistently decrease the likelihood of protest and
violence in both samples while higher AIS scores increase engagement in protest. SDO

and RIS have the expected impact on the outcomes, but are less consistent between
the two samples. For example, higher SDO scores decrease engagement in protest in
both samples, but only increase engagement in violence for some targets in the
Moroccan sample. Similarly, higher RIS scores decrease engagement in protest in the
Egyptian sample only but increase some forms of violent engagement in the Moroccan
sample only. Overall, these social-personality factors demonstrate clearer impacts on
the outcome variables than did the treatment conditions.
In Tables 5 and 6, we examine participants’ level of justification for both protest
and various forms of violence that are directed at local targets and against US targets,
respectively. The test of each question appears below the table. Each dependent
variable is rated on a seven-point scale, so we estimate these models with ordered
logistical regression.
While grievance and risk do not impact actions, higher levels of grievance do
increase justification for local protest in Egypt. Higher levels of risk and opportunity each
decrease justification for some forms of violence in Morocco. The treatments have an
inconsistent impact across samples and are weaker than we have found in previous
studies. When we look at social-personality factors, SDO continues to play the most
consistent role across outcomes and samples. Higher SDO scores are associated with
less justification for protest and more justification for violence. Higher RWA scores are
generally associated with lower justification for any action, though this is not consistent
across all outcomes. As expected, higher AIS scores consistently increase justification
for protest while higher RIS scores increase justification for violence in both samples.
This study expanded on our previous experimental work in three ways: new
samples from countries with recent history of large-scale mobilization, a new treatment
variable, and new social-personality measures. With the Egyptian and Moroccan
samples, our hypotheses about the impact of grievance, risk, and opportunity on
political mobilization are not supported. Though each treatment was occasionally
associated with a significant change in the outcome, no consistent pattern emerges in
these data. While the simplest explanation may be that our treatments did not work,
nearly identical vignettes do elicit the expected results for the grievance and risk
treatments in samples from the United States, Jordan, Malaysia, and – to some degree
– Turkey. While the opportunity treatment did not impact our results in this study, we
may see a significant impact using a different sample as well. Our surprising nonsignificant results suggest that some other mechanism or mechanisms are the driving
force behind decisions on political action in Egypt and Morocco. These data were
collected in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the Arab Spring. Given
the amount of grievance and risk these populations see or experience in their daily
lives, it is possible that participants were already primed to these factors so our
treatments were ineffective at moving this further.

While our treatments had little effect on the outcomes, the social-personality
factors paint a clearer picture. The starting puzzle for this project was to understand why
some people mobilize for political action while others do not, particularly when the
contexts are similar. Individual-level factors like SDO, RWA, AIS, and RIS help to
explain these differences across a range of contexts. As expected, higher SDO scores
are consistently associated with more engagement in and – especially – justification for
violence. This is supported by our previous findings as well. Similarly, higher RWA
scores are consistently associated with lower justification for any action. These were the
first samples where we asked about AIS and RIS, both of which display consistent
impacts on political action. Situational factors alone are insufficient to explain
mobilization and the forms that it can take. Further unpacking how individual-level
characteristics predict differences in mobilization helps us to better address the question
of why some people take political action while others do not.

Conclusion
In the present research, we examine the relative contributions of grievance, risk,
and opportunity with an experimental paradigm. Unlike the previous iterations of our
experiments, we did not find empirical support that grievances have a demonstrable
impact on justifications, but rather that individual-level factors (SDO, RWA, AIS, and
RIS) were more predictive of participation and support across a wide range of actions.

Consistent with our previous data, it is important to emphasize that, in general, we saw
very low levels of engagement in and justification for terrorism.
This work presents some interesting challenges that should be unpacked further.
In many previous experiments, we found a distinct and consistent impact of grievance
on mobilization. However, in the present research this effect is not evident. We have
found empirical support for the importance of SDO and RWA (consistent with our
previous findings) and with the role of AIS and RIS scores, which are a new addition to
our evaluative measures. Additionally, the level of religious fundamentalism generally
corresponded with higher levels of justification for non-violent action, and against more
violent forms of action that explicitly targeted civilians. These findings suggest areas for
further research.
Limitations, contributions, and future directions
One potential limitation of this research design is that the respondents may not
identify strongly with, or relate to, the hypothetical situation described by the treatment.
However, the population from which our sample is drawn is diverse, including adults in
Egypt and Morocco. In fact, given the political climate in both countries, the actual
grievances, risks, and opportunities faced by both populations may overshadow any
impact that our treatments would otherwise have. This could have several different
implications, which lead to a need for additional research for clarification. First, the
experimental manipulation may simply not have worked – and even though grievance
would or should be a factor that is influential in terms of support for both non-violent and
violent forms of political action, it simply was not manipulated in a way that connected
with the particular samples from Egypt and Morocco. Given our past experience with a
wide variety of aforementioned samples, this is unlikely even though it is plausible.
Second, it is possible that the violence associated with the Arab Spring has reduced the
inclination to respond to grievances with either protest or violence. Third, there may not
have been an impact of grievance on the justification levels because they were
relatively fixed and stable across conditions and reflected more deeply held values (i.e.,
protest is generally something that one should or should not do, and acts of violence
toward a range of targets are generally something that one should or should not do).
Thus, the particular “dose” and type of grievance manipulation that was employed here
did not move the needle on justification of forms of action. Rather, the extent to which
the levels of justification were predicted was influenced by individual measures of Social
Dominance Orientation, Activism and Radicalism Intentions, and – to a lesser extent –
Right Wing Authoritarianism. Thus, the findings lend support to individual-level factors
that influence the types of actions that are supported, and to what extent.
Additionally, participants were assigned to one treatment condition rather than
reading multiple vignettes. While this is common in experimental research, it limits
examination of within-person differences. Recent advancements in experimentation,
such as the conjoint design, allow for participants to evaluate multiple scenarios with far

more limited detail to meaningfully assess how contextual factors impact on individual
decisions. This is a consideration for future research.
The current research was inconsistent with our previous findings and
hypotheses, particularly with regard to the impact of grievance. These findings suggest
a number of directions for future work on the relationships between grievances and
mobilization. One important advance would be to seek to confirm and validate these
findings in other cultural and political contexts. It is possible that variation in these
contexts might alter specific conclusions, and this possibility should be investigated in a
systematic fashion to examine the universality of grievances on mobilization.
Experiments of the type employed here have the potential to address many of the
issues that observational data pose, such as measurement problems and endogenous
relationships between mobilization and repression. Importantly, the current research
underscores the importance of individual-level factors to help address the puzzle of why
only some people mobilize for political action – and the forms that action takes.

Notes
1. We also combined the samples and estimated each model reported. In most cases,
the results are unchanged. In a few models, grievance was significant, which is most
likely due to a larger sample size. However, the impact of other variables in these
models washed out and the nuance in country-level differences was lost.
2. We also measured religious fundamentalism (RF; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004)
though we did not have expectations of how this would impact on the outcomes of this
study. We estimated all models reported to include the RF score. Religious
fundamentalism did not have a clear impact on outcomes and did not influence the
impact of other independent variables and thus these models are not reported.
3. The absolute value of the correlations among these variables ranges from 0.015 to
0.473. This reduces concerns about potential multicollinearity when all individual-level
personality variables are included in the models.
4. There is an argument for collapsing the Likert-scale responses into a binary variable
and estimating the models with logistic regression. The greatest concern with this
approach is how to determine the cut-offs in ways that are not arbitrary and thus could
be interpreted at p-hacking. For this reason, we argue that ordered logistic regression is
better despite its restrictive assumptions since it avoids making arbitrary decisions
about the cut-off points. We still estimate the models with logistic regression as well.
The impact of each treatment variable generally does not change. The socio-personality
variables, however, sometimes have different influence on the outcome but there is no
systematic pattern to these changes. Thus, these models are not reported.
5. We also estimated models with a binary indicator of opting to join neither action. The
models produce consistent results and thus are not reported here.

6. We report models for violence against different targets. Due to the low frequency with
which participants state they would engage in each form of violent action, we also
estimated these results with a collapsed violence variable (yes if any of these violent
actions would be taken, no otherwise). The results do not change. Since we see
differences by target of violence, each model is reported separately.

Acknowlegement
The authors would like to thank Elizabeth Karampelas and Jason Levitt for providing
research assistance.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by United States Department of Homeland Security through
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) [grant number 2012-ST-061-CS001].

References
Almanzar, N. A. P., & Herring, C. (2004). Sacrificing for the cause: Another look at highrisk/cost activism. Race and Society, 7, 113–129.
Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right wing authoritarianism.
San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The
short and sweet of it. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14, 47–
47.
Aya, R. (1990). Rethinking revolutions and collective violence: Studies on concept,
theory, and method. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
Bloom, Mia. (2005). Dying to kill. New York: Columbia University Press.
CIA. (2016, December 20). Western Sahara. Retrieved from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html
CNN. (2011, July 1). Morocco approves constitutional reforms. Retrieved from
https://www.cnn. com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/01/morocco.vote.reforms/
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2001). Greed and grievance in civil wars. Retrieved June 10,
2004, from https://
www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf
Crenshaw, Martha (Ed.). (1983). Terrorism, legitimacy and power. Middletown, CT:
Wesleyan University Press.

El-Mahdi, R. (2014). Egypt: A decade of ruptures. In L. Khatib & E. Lust (Eds.), Taking
to the streets: The transformation of Arab activism (pp. 52–75). Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Ennis, J. G., & Schreuer, R. (1987). Mobilizing weak support for social movements: The
role of grievance, efficacy, and cost. Social Forces, 66, 390–409.
Fam, M., & Shahine, A. (2013, June 24). Egypt’s unemployed target Mursi after toppling
Mubarak: Jobs. Bloomberg. Retrieved from
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-24/egypt-sunemployed-target-mursiafter-toppling-mubarak-jobs
Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political
Science Review, 97, 75–90.
Goldstone, J. A., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state
response in the dynamics of contentious action. In R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D.
McAdam, E. Perry, W. Sewell, Jr., S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (Eds.), Silence and voice in the
study of contentious politics (pp. 179–194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goodwin, J. (2001). No other way out: States and revolutionary movements, 1945–91.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization
and conflict since 1945. International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de
science politique, 14, 161–201.
Gurr, T. R., & Moore, W. (1997). Ethnopolitical rebellion: A cross-sectional analysis of
the 1980s with risk sssessments for the 1990s. American Journal of Political Science,
41, 1079–1103.
Hibbs, D. A. (1973). Mass political violence: A cross-national causal analysis. New York,
NY: Wiley.
Horgan, J. (2005). The psychology of terrorism. Cass series: Political violence. New
York, NY: Routledge.
Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2006). Handling and manhandling civilians in civil
war. American Political Science Review, 100, 429–447.
Irons, J. (1998). The shaping of activist recruitment and participation. Gender and
Society, 12, 692–709.
Lemieux, A. F., & Asal, V. H. (2010). Grievance, social dominance orientation, and
authoritarianism in the choice and justification of terror versus protest. Dynamics of
Asymmetric Conflict, 3, 194–207.
Lichbach, M. I. (1995). The rebel’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lichbach, M. I. (1998). Contending theories of contentious politics and the structureaction problem of social order. Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 401–424.
Machiavelli, N. (1532). Concerning mixed principalities. In The Prince. Retrieved from
https://www. constitution.org
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). Manifesto of the communist party. Retrieved May 25,
2011, from https:// www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communistmanifesto/ch01.htm#007
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental methods in political science. Annual Review of
Political Science, 5, 31–61.
Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The distinction
between activism and radicalism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21, 239–260.
Pinard, M. (2011). Motivational dimensions in social movements and contentious
collective action. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP.
Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. (2003). The terrorists in their own words:
Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 15, 171–184.
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. (1994). Social dominance
orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741–763.
Ross, J. I. (1993). Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal
model. Journal of Peace Research, 30, 317–329.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social
hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France,
Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movements (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. The Guardian. (2011, September 9). Egyptian protestors break into Israeli
embassy in Cairo. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/10/egyptian-protesters-israeli-embassycairo
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Transparency International’s National Integrity System Assessments. (2010). Retrieved
from https:// www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nis/

Transparency International’s National Integrity System Assessments. (2011). Retrieved
from https:// www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nis/
Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological
approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 3–42.
Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Appendix
Experimental vignettes that vary levels of grievance, risk, and opportunity are presented
below. The critical experimental passages that vary between conditions are presented
in italics. Note: Because this is a between-subjects design, participants will read and
respond to one vignette.
Condition 1: Low grievance, low risk, low opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you used to suffer discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago. But treatment of the Estamese has improved since
then.
You are a university student. You occasionally hear comments about your
ethnicity from fellow students. But on the whole you have been accepted and have good
relations with students of many ethnicities. Your professors treat you fairly. Incidents
involving discrimination against Estamese students are rare. On one occasion, you
witnessed a fight that started when two Estamese students were attacked by Buchari
students. The police arrested the Buchari students, and left the two Estamese students
alone.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig does not have strong connections in the Estamese
community, and in the past few people have attended his protests. Vadan has also
approached you. In a secret meeting,
Vadan asked you if you would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation
Organization in its plans to launch violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out
and hurting the oppressors can the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You
know that the Estamese Liberation Organization has few members and little access to
weapons or bombs, and that their past attempts at launching violent attacks have
frequently failed.

When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest or the violent
attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very low. The police force is corrupt
and inefficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you were
involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very small chance of
being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 2: Low grievance, high risk, low opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you used to suffer discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago. But treatment of the Estamese has improved since
then.
You are a university student. You occasionally hear comments about your
ethnicity from fellow students. But on the whole you have been accepted and have good
relations with students of many ethnicities. Your professors treat you fairly. Incidents
involving discrimination against Estamese students are rare. On one occasion, you
witnessed a fight that started when two Estamese students were attacked by Buchari
students. The police arrested the Buchari students, and left the two Estamese students
alone.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig does not have strong connections in the Estamese
community, and in the past few people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has few members and little access to weapons or bombs, and that their
past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently failed.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest march or the
violent attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very high. The Buchara police
force is very efficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you
were involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very high chance
of being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 3: High grievance, low risk, low opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you have long suffered discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago.

You are a university student. You are discriminated against because you are
Estamese. Fellow students make humiliating comments about your ethnicity. Your work
is as good as that of your peers, but you consistently receive lower grades. Even
Estamese like you with a good education are hired last and fired first. The authorities
treat Estamese citizens unfairly. For example, the police stop Estamese without any
reason. Estamese are not allowed to vote or to express their political views. Buchari
leaders regularly deride the Estamese as unpatriotic and ridicule Estamese culture and
language.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig does not have strong connections in the Estamese
community, and in the past few people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has few members and little access to weapons or bombs, and that their
past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently failed.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest or the violent
attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very low. The police force is corrupt
and inefficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you were
involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very small chance of
being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 4: High grievance, high risk, low opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you have long suffered discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago.
You are a university student. You are discriminated against because you are
Estamese. Fellow students make humiliating comments about your ethnicity. Your work
is as good as that of your peers, but you consistently receive lower grades. Even
Estamese like you with a good education are hired last and fired first. The authorities
treat Estamese citizens unfairly. For example, the police stop Estamese without any
reason. Estamese are not allowed to vote or to express their political views. Buchari
leaders regularly deride the Estamese as unpatriotic and ridicule Estamese culture and
language.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and

march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig does not have strong connections in the Estamese
community, and in the past few people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has few members and little access to weapons or bombs, and that their
past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently failed.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest march or the
violent attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very high. The Buchara police
force is very efficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you
were involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very high chance
of being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 5: Low grievance, low risk, high opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you used to suffer discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago. But treatment of the Estamese has improved since
then.
You are a university student. You occasionally hear comments about your
ethnicity from fellow students. But on the whole you have been accepted and have good
relations with students of many ethnicities. Your professors treat you fairly. Incidents
involving discrimination against Estamese students are rare. On one occasion, you
witnessed a fight that started when two Estamese students were attacked by Buchari
students. The police arrested the Buchari students, and left the two Estamese students
alone.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig has strong connections in the Estamese community, and in
the past many people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has many members and easy access to weapons and bombs, and that
their past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently succeeded.

When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest or the violent
attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very low. The police force is corrupt
and inefficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you were
involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very small chance of
being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 6: Low grievance, high risk, high opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you used to suffer discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago. But treatment of the Estamese has improved since
then.
You are a university student. You occasionally hear comments about your
ethnicity from fellow students. But on the whole you have been accepted and have good
relations with students of many ethnicities. Your professors treat you fairly. Incidents
involving discrimination against Estamese students are rare. On one occasion, you
witnessed a fight that started when two Estamese students were attacked by Buchari
students. The police arrested the Buchari students, and left the two Estamese students
alone.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig has strong connections in the Estamese community, and in
the past many people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has many members and easy access to weapons and bombs, and that
their past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently succeeded.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest march or the
violent attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very high. The Buchara police
force is very efficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you
were involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very high chance
of being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 7: High grievance, low risk, high opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you have long suffered discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago.

You are a university student. You are discriminated against because you are
Estamese. Fellow students make humiliating comments about your ethnicity. Your work
is as good as that of your peers, but you consistently receive lower grades. Even
Estamese like you with a good education are hired last and fired first. The authorities
treat Estamese citizens unfairly. For example, the police stop Estamese without any
reason. Estamese are not allowed to vote or to express their political views. Buchari
leaders regularly deride the Estamese as unpatriotic and ridicule Estamese culture and
language.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and
march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig has strong connections in the Estamese community, and in
the past many people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has many members and easy access to weapons and bombs, and that
their past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently succeeded.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest or the violent
attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very low. The police force is corrupt
and inefficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you were
involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very small chance of
being caught and punished by the authorities.
Condition 8: High grievance, high risk, high opportunity
You are a member of the minority Estamese ethnic group in the country of
Buchara. Estamese like you have long suffered discrimination, and rebelled against the
Buchari authorities decades ago.
You are a university student. You are discriminated against because you are
Estamese. Fellow students make humiliating comments about your ethnicity. Your work
is as good as that of your peers, but you consistently receive lower grades. Even
Estamese like you with a good education are hired last and fired first. The authorities
treat Estamese citizens unfairly. For example, the police stop Estamese without any
reason. Estamese are not allowed to vote or to express their political views. Buchari
leaders regularly deride the Estamese as unpatriotic and ridicule Estamese culture and
language.
Recently, you have been approached by two fellow Estamese students who
would like to see you get involved politically. Dalig has asked you to help organize and

march in a peaceful protest. A non-violent march will revive the cause of Estamese
nationalism and bring it to the attention of the Buchara government and the rest of the
world. You know that Dalig has strong connections in the Estamese community, and in
the past many people have attended his protests.
Vadan has also approached you. In a secret meeting, Vadan asked you if you
would be willing to support the Estamese Liberation Organization in its plans to launch
violent attacks. Vadan argues that only by striking out and hurting the oppressors can
the spirit of Estamese nationalism be rekindled. You know that the Estamese Liberation
Organization has many members and easy access to weapons and bombs, and that
their past attempts at launching violent attacks have frequently succeeded.
When thinking about taking part in either the peaceful protest march or the
violent attack, you know that the personal risk you face is very high. The Buchara police
force is very efficient when it comes to dealing with challenges to the government. If you
were involved in any kind of challenge to the government, you face a very high chance
of being caught and punished by the authorities.

